




JOHN BARTON PAYNE, DIRECTOR GENERAL 
OF RAILROADS, ETC., 
v. 
L. J. UPTON & COMPANY, INC. 
Record 632 
FBOM THE CmCUIT COUBT OF NORFOLK COUNTY 1 VIRGINIA. 
"The briefs shall be print d in type not less in size than 
small pica, and shall be nine inches in length and six inches 
in width, so as to conform in dimt>.nsions to the printed 
records along with which they are to be bound, in accord-
ance with Act of Assembly, approved March 1, 1903; and 
the clerks of this court are directed not to receive or file a 
brief not conforming in all respects to the aforementioned 
requirements.'' 
The foregoing is printed in small pica type for the infor-
mation of counsel. 
H. STEW ART JONES, Clerk. 
)3/ 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
JOHN BARTON PAYNE, DIR.ECTOR GENERAL OF 
RAILROADS. AND AGENT DESIGNATED BY THE 
PRESIDENT, ETC., Plaintiff in Error, 
I 
v. 
L. J~ UPTON & COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Defendant 
in Error. 
I 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF ERROR. 
. I 
To the Honorable the Judg,es of the Stttpre'lne Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 1 
Your petitioner, John Barton Payne, Director General of 
Railroads, and Agent designated by the President, under the 
terms of Section 206 of the Transportation Act of 1920, re-
spectfully showeth unto this Honorable Court that he is ag-
grieved by a judgment of the Circuit Court of Norfolk County, 
Virg-inia, entered on the 26th day ,of July, 1928, in favor of 
L. J. Upton and Company, Incorporated, ag-ainst'' John Bar-
ton Payne, Agent operating Southern R.ailway Gomnany", 
for the sum of Two Hundred and Forty-Two Dollars 
($242.00). with interest thereon from the 28th day of June, 
1918, until paid. (Tr .• p. 7.) A transcript of the record in 
the case is presented. herewith. 
A petition for a writ of error was, through inadvertence, 
heretofore presented in this case in the name of ''Southern 
Railway Company", which had been formerly dismissed as a 
party herein on July 23rd, 1928. That petition was denied by 
the several judges of the court, and this petition is now pre-
sented to the Court by your petitioner (against whom a valid 
judgment only may be obtained under the provisions of Sec-
tion 206a of an Act of Congress o~ the United States known as 
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the "Transportation Act, 1920' ', adopted February 28th, 
1920), as authorized and permitted by Section 6348 of the 
Code of Virginia. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
By the terms of the Transportation Act approved February 
28, 1920 ( 41 Stat. 456) Congress provided for the termination 
of the Federal Control of Railroads as of March 1, 1920, with 
the -provision that actions at la'v based on causes of action 
arising out of the Federal operation of any railroad, of such 
character, as prior to Federal Control, could have been 
brought against the carrier, could, ·after the termination of 
Federal Control, be brought against an A{lent to be desig-
nated by the President for such purpose; the actions to b_~ 
brought in any court which, but for Federal control, would 
have had jurisdiction of the cause of action, had it arisen 
ag-ainst the carrier; and s1.tch actions to be bro~tght not later 
than two years after the passa,qe of the act. A copy of Sec-
tion 206a of the act embodying the foregoing provision is 
attached hereto in Appendix. page 21. 
The act further provided that all final judg-ments in such 
actions rendered against the Agent ~esig-nated by the Presi-
dent under sub-division (a) thereof should be promptlv paid 
out of a revolving- fund created by the act. Section 206c. 
On June 10, 1920, the respondent instituted this action 
a!rainst "John Barton Payne, Directo-r General of Railroads, 
Walker D. Hines. formerly Director General, of Railroad'~ 
and Southern Railway Company, ·a corporation". (Tr., p. 
28.) Process was served June 11, 1920, "by delivering a true 
copy thereof to George A. McGee, Ag-ent of the Southern Rail-
''(.ray Company where he resides". (Tr., p. 28.) On the third 
l\Ionday in July, 1920, the 19th day of that month, respondent 
filed its declaration naming the aforesaid parties as defend-
ants and claiming damages in the amount of One Thousand 
Dollars ($1.000.00) on account of the alleged delayed delivery 
of certain shipments of cucumbers and potatoes from Norfolk 
County, Virg-inia, to the City of New York, New Yorlr, over 
the lines of the Southen1 Railway and it: connecting carriers 
during the period of Federal Control. (Tr., p. 1.) 
The Southern Railway Company appeared and pleaded not 
guilty on October 4, 1920, and on June 7, 1926, again appeared 
and moved the court to dismiss the action against it on the 
ground of improper joinder as a party defendant, the hearing 
of which motion was continued. No plea or appearance was 
entered in behalf of ~'John Barton Pa)rne, Director General 
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of Railroads, or Walker D. Hines, formerly Director General 
of Railroads", but on July 23, 1928, counsel for each of the 
three defendants moved the trial court to dismiss the action 
as to each of them, whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff 
moved the court to be allowed to amend the declaration by 
adding to the words ''John Barton Payne, Director General 
of Railroads'' the words'' and Agent designated by the Presi-
dent under the terms of Section 206 of the Transportation 
Act of 1920". (Tr., p. 9.) 
Thereupon, the trial court dismissed the· action as to '' Wal-
ker D. Hines, formerly Director General of Railroads'' and as 
to the "Southern Railway Company", but overruled the 
motion to dismiss the action as to ''John Barton Payne, Direc-
tor General of Railroads'' and, ·w;ithout issuance of any pro-
cess or summons making him a pcvrty to the proceedin,q as 
such .Agent, ordered the declaration to be amended by in-
serting after the words ''John Barton Payne, Director Gen-
eral of Railroads" the words ''and also Agent designated by 
the President under the terms of Section 206 of the Trans-
portation Act of 1920'~. (Tr., p. 9.) To the foregoing action 
· of the trial court your petitioner duly excepted (Tr., p. 8), and 
thereupon the action proceeded to trial before a jury, result-
ing in ·a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of Two Hun-
dred and Forty-Two Dollars ($242.00) with interest thereon 
from June 28, 1918 (Tr., p. 7). Your petitioner thereupoll 
moved the trial court to set aside such verdict as contrary 
to law and the evidence, which motion was overruled, and 
on July 26, 1928, judgment was entered upon the verdict with 
costs (Tr., p. 7). 
On ~farch 11, 1920, the President appointed Walker D. 
Hines, tl1en Director General of Railroads as ~\gent under 
Section 206a of the Transportation Act. A copy of such proc-
lamation is ~ttached hereto in Appendix, pages 21 and 22~ On 
1\iay 18, 1920, 1\fr. Hines resigned as Director General of 
Railroads and Agent and on the same day John Barton Payne 
became Director General and Agent as Mr. Hines' successor. 
Copies of the proclamations appointing Mr. Payne successor 
to Mr. Hines are attached hereto in Appendix, pages 22 and 
23. 
· The Federal Control and operation of railroads having 
terminated on March 1, 1920, it is apparent that when this 
action 'vas instituted on June 10, 1920, it should have been 
brought against ''John Barton Payne as Agent of the Presi-
dent, etc." This 'vas not done, however, and John B.arton 
Payne was sued as "Director General of Railroads". No 
effort was made by the plaintiff to make P&yne a party to 
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the proceeding ''as Agent for the President'' under the pro-
visions of Section 206a of the Transportation Act until July 
23, 1928, more tham eight years after the adoption of the Act, 
notwithstanding its requirements that actions based on causes 
of action arising out of the Federal Control of railroads 
should be brought against an'' Agent designated by the Presi-
dent for such purpose" not later than hvo years from the 
date of the passa,qe of the act. 
The action of t~e trial court in allowing the plaintiff to 
amend his declaration in the manner aforesaid was in no 
sense, therefore, legally effective to make John Barton Payne 
as the ''Agent designated by the President'' under the pro-
visions of Section 206a of the Transportation Act, an actual 
party defendant to the proceeding, and the judgment entered 
herein against him is, therefore, null and void, and should be 
· reviewed and reversed by this Honorable Court. 
ASSIGNJ\1ENT OF ERROR. 
The action of the trial court in permitting the plaintiff 
to amend its declaration on July 23, 1928, by adding to the 
name of the defendant, ''John Barton Payne, Director Gen-
eral of Railroads" the words "and also Agent designate-d by 
the President under the terms of Section 206 of the Trans-
portation Act" and in permitting the case to go to judg-
ment against him, is a nullity since the cause of action sued 
upon arose during the Federal Control of railroads and as 
the suit was not brought against John Barton Payne as 
"Agent designated by the President'' as required by the pro-
visions of Section 206a of the Transportation Act, no amencl-
ment of the proceedings so as to make him a proper party 
defendant could be lawfully made later than two years from 
the adoption of the Transportation _Act of February 28, 1920. 
ARGUMENT. 
(1.) 
A suit against an Agent designated by the President pur-. 
suant to Section 206a of the Transportation Act of 1920 is a 
suit aga_inst the U~Jtited States. · 
The foregoing principle is now fully established by the 
decisions of the Courts in the following cases: 
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Ault, 256 U. S. 554; 
Dahn v. Davis, .Agent, 258 U. S. 421; 
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E. I. duPont DeNen~oUtrs Comp01111J v. Davis, 264 U. S. 456; 
Davis, Agent, v. Donnova;n, 265 U. S. 257; 
Ranch v. Davis, Director General,· 8. Fed. (2d) 907; 
Moss v. Davis, Director General (S.C.), 137 S. E. 442. 
(2.) 
·The United States can be sued only 'With the consent of 
Congress and the conditions irnposed by Congress must be 
strictly followed. 
This proposition is also fully established by the following, 
and numerous other cases: 
Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U. S. 20; 
Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. 433; 
Hans v. State of Louisi(llna, 134 U. S. 1; 
Stq;n:tey v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255. 
In Davis, Agent, v. Dontnovan, 265 U.S. 257, it is said: 
"During the year 1919 the United States were in posses-
sion and complete control by the Director General of the 
important railway systems throughout the country. Northern 
Pacific Railway CmntJa.nJI v. North Dakota·, 250 U. S. 135. 
As the representative of the United States he was subject to 
be sued for the purpose and to the extent but under the con-
ditions prescribed by statute and orders issued thereunder-
and not otherwi~e." dttPont. DeN en~ours Company v. Davis,. 
Agent, 264 U. S. 456. 
See also Moss v. Davis, Direct,or General (S. C.), 137 S. 
E. 442. 
(3.) 
A suit brought aqainst "John Barton Payne, Director Gen-
eral of Ra.ilroads", 'was not a suit again-st the United Sta.tes 
in complianwe with Section 206a of the Transportation Act 
of 1920. and the jud,rnnent ente1·ed therein is a n.ullity so far 
as the United States is concerned. 
The alleged cause of action grew out of the operation of 
the Southern Railway Company by the Director General of 
Railroads. Under Section 206a of the Transportation· Act of 
1920 Congress consented that suits might be brought against 
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an "Agent designated by the President" on such causes of 
aetion, within periods of limitation prescribed by State or 
Federal Statutes but 'il-Ot after t~vo years from the passage 
of the Act, on February 28, 1920. This was a consent of the 
government of the United States to be sued and all persons 
seeking to take advantage of such consent 'vere, under the au-
thorities previously referred to, required to comply strictly 
with the provisions of that act. 
(a) The suit was not brmtght in cmnpliarnce with the pro-
. v-isions of the Statute. 
Pursuant to Section 206a of the Transportation Act of 
1920, the President, on ~{arch 11, 1920, by proclamation (copy 
of which is set out in appendi.~~ pages 21 and 22), designated 
"Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads, and his 
successor in office as the Agent provided for in Section 206 of 
said Act, approved Februa.ry 28, 1920". Suits against the 
government on account of causes of action growing out of 
the operation of railroads were, therefore, then required to 
. be brought against Walker D. Hines, Director General of 
Railroads as such Agent. Walker D. Hines was already 
Director General of Railroads. The A_qen.t designated by 
the President for the purpose of such suits, could have been 
some other person, and it is a coincidence rather than a legal 
consequence, that the President designated the same person 
as Director General of Railroads and the Agent to be sued. 
The two offices, while occupied by the same person, continued 
to be separate and distinct. If Congress had intended that 
suits should be brought against the Director ·General of Rail-
roads, it 'vould not have made provision for the appoint-
ment of an Agent to be sued, or for the substitution of such 
Agent for the Director General of Railroads, in suits pend-
ing at the end of Federal control as was done in paragraph 
(d) of Section 206 of the Transportation Act. 
On May 14, 1920, the President issued two proclamations 
(copies of which are set out in appendix, pages 22 and 23), 
in one of which the resignation of Walker D. Hines as Director 
General of Railroads and the appointment of John Barton 
Payne as his successor in office, effective May 18, 1920, was 
announced, and in the other the resignation of Walker D. 
Hines as the Agent against whom such suits might be brought 
and the appointment of John Barton Payne as his successor 
in such office was announced, effective as of May 18, 1920. 
The action at law in the instant case was instituted June 
10, 1920, and to comply with the consent of Congress in 
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making John Barton Payne, while holding the office of Agent, 
the defendant, it was necessary to describe him as "John 
Barton Payne, Director General of Railroads and .rf.qent 
designated by the President pursuant to Section 206 of the 
Transportation Act of 1920", or in equivalent language. 
The suit was not so instituted. The summons ran to ''John 
Barton Payne, Director General of Railroads" (Tr., p. 28), 
and the declarations when filed also ran against ''John Bar-
ton Payne, Director General of Railroads" (Tr., p. 1). 
The suit was, therefore, not a suit against the ''Agent desig-
nated by the President" but a suit against "John Barton 
Payne, Director General of Railroads'', and no valid judg-
ment against the United States was obtainable in such pro-
ceeding unless and until John Barton Payne ''as Agent desig-
nated by the President'' was properly made a party there-
to within two years after the adoption of the Transportation 
Act of 1920, Section 206a. 
In Rauch v. Dav·is, 270 U. S. 653, a certiorari to the Court of 
Appeals of the District of Columbia was denied. In that 
case Rauch commenced an action in the Supreme Court of 
New York County, N.Y., on May 19, 1920, against "Walker 
D. Hines, Director General (Hudson and Manhattan Rail-
way Comnany) ",seeking damages for personal injuries su.s-
tained while a passenger during the period of Federal Con- · 
trol. -:1\fr. Hines had retired as Director General on May 18, 
1920, the day preceding institution of the action and John 
Barton Payne had been appointed to succeed him. On De-
cember 17. 1923, more than hvo years subsequent to the pas-
sage of the Transportation Act, the plaintiff was granted 
leave to amend the name of the defendant upon the summons, 
complaint and all other papers in the case, so as to make the 
same read ''James C. Davis, Director General of Railroads 
(Hudson and Manhattan Railway Company), and ~gent of 
the President". 
In holding a judgment rendered against Davis as Ar~ent 
void, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (8 Fed. 
(2d) 907) said: 
''The action now in question was not properly commenced 
... " . . 
In Mellon, Director General, v. Purse Bros., 148 Va. 262, 
the plaintiff brought an action in J nne, 1921, against ''John 
Barton Payne, Director General of Railroads, etc.", for the 
recovery of damag-es for negligent failure to safely transport 
freight over the lines of the Norfolk-Southern Railroad, dur-
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ing the period of Federal control. At the time of the insti-
tution of the action, John Barton Payne was not Director 
General of Railroads, nor statutory agent, having resigned 
March 28, 1921, and both of those offices were 'filled at that 
· time ·by James C. Davis. On November 4, 1925, plaintiff was 
permitted by the trial court to strike out· the name of John 
Barton Payne as defendant in the ease, and substitute in his 
place the name of James C. Davis as ''Director General of 
Railroads and Agent, under Section 206 of the Transporta-
tion Act of 1920'', etc., and the action thereupon proceeded to 
judgment against him. · · 
After a very full reYiew of a greater number of the more 
recent Federal and State cases bearing upon ·this question, 
this court said : · 
"In the instant case the 'agent designated by the Presi-
dent for such purpose' is neither named nor described in 
the notice of motion; the director general mentioned in the 
notice did not hold that position or the position of agent, 
either when the action was brought or at any time . there~ . 
after, and the action was not revived, nor was the motion to 
substitute James C. Davis as agent made till after the lapse 
o~ four years from the time the action was brought. The 
· action was not properly brought in the first instance, no 
motion was made to amend within the time prescr.ibed by 
law, and the refusal of the writ of certiorari in Raush v. Davis, 
supra, seems to be conclusive of the instant case.'' (Italics 
supplied.) 
The case of Raush v. Davis, referred to in the foregoing 
quotation, had been previously quoted from in the opinion 
of the court, and is reported in 8 Fed. ( 2d) 906, certiorari 
denied, 270 U. S. 563. 
In Tutsch v. Director General of Railroads (Calif.), 199 
Pac. 861, the plaintiff filed a complaint on July 23, 1920, 
against the ''Director General of Railroads'' for the re-
covery of damages claimed for personal injuries sustained 
July 24, 1919, due to the alleged negligence of the Los An-
geles and Salt Lake Railroad Company during Federal Con ... 
~rol. On August 17, 1920, plaintiff sought to amend her com-
plaint- by making John Barton Payne as '' A.qent. designated 
by the President" a party defendant. Under the laws of 
California actions upon claims for personal injury were 
barred in one year. In affirming the action of the Superior. 
Court of Los Angeles County, denying plaintiff leave to amend 
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her complaint in the manner stated, the District Court of Ap-
peals of California said : 
"Pursuant to the authority conferred by subdivision (a), 
the President designated John Barton Payne as the agent 
against whom actions of the character here involved should 
be brought. It thus appears that when the complaint herein 
was filed on July 23, 1920, no warrant of law existed for 
suing the Director General of Railroads on account of the 
injury sustained by plaintiff, and hence the complaint stated 
no cause of action against bini. Subdivision 3 of Section 340, 
Code of Civil Procedure, provides that the period for com-
mencing an action for damages sustained by reason of the 
'vrongful act or negligence of another is one year; hence, 
'vhen plaintiff on Augu!'t 17, 1920, sought to amend her com-
plaint by making John Barton Payne the party defendant, 
more than one year had elapsed subsequent to the date of the 
injury; and, since by subdivision (a) of Section 206. such 
actions are required to be brought within the period of limi-
tation prescribed by the Code, the action, unless the complaint 
was subject to such amendment, was, as to such proposed 
def~ndant, barred by the statute. 
. * 
Moreover, other than as authorized by Section 206 of the 
Federal Transportation Act, no warrant existed for suing 
John Barton Payne as such Agent, and, since plaintiff in 
bringing the action sought to avail herself of the plivilege 
,so granted by s~ecial a.ct.. in ·order to maintain the same. she 
must have strictly complied with the terms and conditions 
embodied in the stntute, one of the provisions of which i~ 
that such suits must be brought within the period there speci-
fied. :whirh, as anplied in this case, is one year from the date 
of the injury. Carr v. United 8tastes. 98 U. S. 433, 25 L. Erl. 
209: Price v. Un.ited States, 174 U. S. 373, 19 Sun. Ct. 765. 
43 L. Ed. 1 011 : Section 52, Vol. 25, p. 416. Ruling Case 
Law.'' (Page 862.) . 
In Vassmt v. Nortlu~rn Pa.cijic Rail·way Compan?J (~{ont.), 
221 Pac. 1069, an action was instituted by the plaintiff on 
September 12, 1921, against ''Northern Pacific R.ailway Com-
Pany, a cornoration, and John Barton Payne, as Director 
General of Railroads and as Ag;ent appointed by ti1e Presi-
dent under the Transnortation Act of 1920" for alleged dam-
ngPs ton shipment of sheep on November 1, 1919, over the line 
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of the Northern Pacific Railway Company during tne period 
of Federal Control. At the time the action was commenced 
James C. Davis was, and for nearly six months pr1or tllereto 
had been, the Agent· appointed oy the President under Sec-
tion 206a of the Transportation Act, as the person against 
·whom actions of this character should be instituted. On 
February 4, 1922, upon motion of the plaintiff the title of the 
action was changed by inserting ''James C. Davh as Agent 
appointed by the President under the Transportation Act of 
1920" in lieu of the defendants named in the original com-
plaint. In holding that the action had been improperly 
brought and that the amendment of February 4th, 1922, was 
ineffective to make Davis a. party defendant because made 
more than two years after delivery of the live stock at desti-
nation as required by a provision on the Bill of lading, the 
court said: 
''The complaint did not state a cause of action against 
either of the parties originally made defendants. The only 
means by 'vhich the responsible defendant-the United States 
-could be sued was by maldng; James C. Davis, presidential 
Agent, defendant, and plaintiffs chose to sue the wrong party 
and must abide the consequences of their error. Davidson 
v. Payne (D. C.), 289 Fed. 69. '' (Page 1073.) 
In Davis, Director General of Railroads v. Griffith (Okla.), 
229 Pac. 499. plaintiff commenced an action on April 6, 1921, 
against "John Barton Payne. Ag·ent, United States R-ail-
road Administration, Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Rail-
way Company'', to recover damages alleged to have been 
caused by the negligent delay in the transportation of a ship-
ment of cattle during the period of Federal Control. At the 
time of the institution of the action John Barton Payne 
had resigned and James C. Davis had been appointed aR 
''Agent for the President'' under the provisions of the Traii:s-
porta.tion Act of 1920. On July 15, 1921, on motion of the 
plaintiff, the trial court entered an order directing that 
''James C. Davis, Director General of Railroads, as Agent 
under Section 206 of the Transportation Act of 1920" be sub-
stituted as party defendant in lieu of the parties against 
whom the action had been commenced. On July 16, 1921, 
without issuing a summons or procuring service thereof on 
. Davis as such Agent, judgment was rendered against him 
for the amount sued for. In reversing the action of the trial 
court in permitting judgment to be rendered against Davis 
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as Agent without his having been served with process as a 
party defendant, the court said: 
"It is clear, therefore, when the United States Govern-
ment, by ·act of Congress, consented to be sued and directed 
that suits should be maintained against it by suing the' Agent 
designated by the President for such purpose', which means 
the same thing as the Agent who was 'named' by the Presi-
dent for such purpose, that a suit could 'not be brought 
against the government, except by bringing it against the 
'person' who was named and who was acting as the Agent 
under the Transportation Act of 1920. The government, the 
sovereign power, consented to be sued, and. the manner in 
'vhich it consented to be sued was a sovereign edict, and it 
must be complied with strictly, whether we feel that it is 
reasonable or unreasonable. 
We conclude that the United States could be sued, only, 
by making the Agent, named by the President under Trans-
portation ·Act of 1920 for such purpose, party defendant, 
who in this instance was James C. Davis ; and that the trial 
court acquired no jurisdiction by the atten~pted substitu,tion 
of Davis for Payrn.e, since such jurisdiction could be had, only 
by service of process." 
In Jenness v. Payne, Director General of Railroads (N. 
H.), 125 Atl. 679, the plaintiff instituted action on December 
31. 1920, for the recovery of damages for the alleged negligent 
killing of a pair of mules on February 21, 1919, at a grade 
crossing on the Boston and Maine Railroad while it was 
operated by the defendant as Director General of Railroads. 
John Barton Payne, Director General of Railroads, appeared 
specially but nothing further was done until March 4, 1922, 
when he moved to dismiss the action because the same had 
not been brought against him ''As Agent designated by the 
President under the provisions of the Transportation Act of 
1920". The trial court overruled the motion and in re· 
versing this action the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
said: 
''Since the Government cannot be sued without its con-
sent (Cornwall v. Commonwealth, 82: Va. 644, 3 Am. St. Rep. 
121; State v. ·Mutual Life Ins. Co., 179 Ind. 59, 93 N. E. 213, 
42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 256; Raymond v. State, 54 Miss. 562, 28 
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Am. St. Rep. 382; 25 R. C. L. 416, Sec. 52), it must be held 
that it is not a party to this proceeding, for the statute which 
authorizes suits on such causes of action provides that after 
Federal control terminates such suits shall be brought against 
an agent designated by the President, not, as was done in 
this case, against the Dire,ctor General of Railroads. 
The court found, from the fact the Director General of 
Railroads and the Agent designated b'y the President to de-
fend su.its on such causes of action are the same person, that 
'making John B-arton Payne," Di1·ector General of Railroads, 
instead of Agent designated by the President, was a 'mere 
'misnomer, and that the only way in which it could be taken 
advantage of was by a plea in abatement filed during the first 
four days of the term. It is enough, in so far as this find-
ing is concerned, to say that the only way in which the pl(l)in-
tiff could make the go'Penvmenf a pa'rty to the proceeding 
was by proceedin.g in accordance with the provisions of sec-
tion 206 (a), and that he failed to do. In other _words, al-
though Congress might have provided that the government 
may be made a party in the same way as ·an individual, 
it has not done so; consequently, it cannot be fo'lilnd that the 
government is the defendant in this action from the mere 
fact the same n~an happened to be Director General of Rail-
roads and Agent designated by the President to defend suits 
on causes of action arising out of federal control.'' (Pp. 679-
680.) . 
(b) The atternpted amendn~ent of the decla1·ation so as 
to make John Ba.rton. Pa.yne a party thereto as Agent was 
not the correction of an error in the name of the defendant, 
but the bringing in of a different deferulant, and was in effect 
the commencement of a new and independent proceeding 
against him to enforce the liability of the United States Gov-
ernment. 
Although the action was instituted on June 10, 1920, no at-
tempt was made until July 23, 1928, to properly make John. 
Barton Payne "as Agent designated by the· President" a 
defendant. On the latter date the plaintiff's counsel moved 
for leave, and the trial court granted leave, to amend the 
declaration by adding to ''John· Barton Payne, Director Gen-
eral of Railr-oads" the words "and the Agent designated by 
the President rinder the terms of Section 206 of the Trans:. 
.Tohn Barton Payne, etc., v. ·L. J. Upton & Co. 13 
portation Act of 1920". No process or sumrnons was ever 
issued against John Barton Payne as s~ech .Agent. The effect 
of such amendment was not to correct an error in the name 
of the defendant, but to bring in an entirely different de-
fendant. It was tantamount to the commencement of a new 
and· independent proceeding against John Barton Payne as 
Agent in conformity with the provisions of Section 206a 
of the Transportation Act in order to enforce liability of 
the United States Government thereunder. 
In Davis v. Gohen and Oompa;ny, 268 U. S. 638,' a suit was 
brought by Cohen and Company in January, 1920, against 
the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company 
to recover damages to freig·ht shipped over the railroad in 
1918 when it was under federal control. While the railroad 
company was described in a writ as a corporation operated 
and controlled by the United States Railroad Administration, 
the writ was· directed to and served upon the Railroad Com-
pany alone and the declaration was filed against it alone, no 
effort being then made to sue the Director General as re-
quired by the Federal Control Act. In this situation there was 
no suit pending at the termination of Federal Control ag·ainst 
the Director General to enforce the liability of the govern-
ment. In reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
1\Hssouri, permitting an amendment in October, 1922, more 
than two ~fears after the a-doption of the Transportation Act 
of 1920, allowing an amendment of the writ and declaration 
in the suit by substituting for the railroad company, the 
Agent designated by the President under Section 206a of 
the Transportation Act the court said: 
''The amendment of the writ and declaration in the suit 
against the railroad company, in October, 1922, by substituting 
the designated Agent as the defendant, was, in effect, the 
commencement of a new and independent proceeding to en-
force this liability. Being commenced more than two year~ 
after the passage of the transportation act, it "\Vas repugnant 
to the provisions of Section 206 of the act requiring such an 
action to be instituted not later than two years after the pas-
sage of the act. '-' 
In Mellon v. Ark. L. d1 N. Company, decided_June 3, 1928, 
United States Supreme Court advance opinions, 72 L. Ed. 155, 
it is said: · · 
"The United States had not consented to being sued after 
the termination of Federal control except as. provided by Sec4 
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tion 206 of the Transportation Act; that is, by a suit brought 
against the Agent designated by the President for such pur-
po~e, within the period of limitation prescribed by the state 
statute. This plainly meant that the suit must be brought 
within the period of limitation against the person who was 
the designated agent and alone had authority to represent 
the government. The bringing of the suit against Payne, 
who was not the designated Agent, was not a compliance 
with this requirement, and brought no representative of the 
government before the court. Davidson v. Payn-e (C. C. A. 
8th), 289 Fed. 69. The substitu.tion of Davis, the designated 
A,qent, was not the correction of atn error in the narne of the 
defendant, but the bringing in of a different defend(Jfnt, and 
was in effect the co1n/mence1nent o.f a new· and independent 
proceedin,q a.qainst hi1n to enforce the liabilif~J of the ,qovern-
·ment. See Davis v. L. L. Cohen an.d Co., 268 U. S. 638, 642, 
69 L. Ed. 1129, 1133, 45 Sup. Ct. 633 ; Mellon v. Weiss, 270 
U.S. 565, 567. 70 L. Ed. 736, 737, 46b Sup. Ct. Rep. 378. And, 
as this substitution, being made more than three years after 
the cause of action had accrued, was not a compliance with 
the requirement of the Transportation Act that the action be 
brought against the designated Agent. within the period of 
limitation prescribed by the state statute. the plea should 
have been sustained and the suit dismissed.'' 
In Vassa1t v. Northe1·n Pacific Rwy. (Mont.), 221 Pac. 
1069. the facts of which have been previously stated, the 
court said: 
"The effect of the order of February 4. 1922 (substituting 
Davis for Payne as Director General and Agent, etc.), was 
not merely to a.mend the pleading by correcting the name of 
the defendant, but to bring into the action .for the first time 
the only responsible defendant, the United States." 
It is recognized that in the foregoing cases, the decision 
that a new party had been brought in after two years in con-
travention of the provisions of Section 206a of the Trans-
portation Act has reference to a new person as well as a new 
party, while in the instant case the same person was sought 
to be brought before the court as a party defendant, but in 
a different official capacity. This fact does not, however, 
serve to prevent the· application of the principle announced 
in the foregoing authorities for the reason that when the 
action wa.s instituted against ''John Barton Payne, Director 
General of Railroads'', no jurisdiction whatever was ob-
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tained against the United States by whom judgments founded 
upon claims arising out of Federal Control are payable out 
of the revolving fund provided by Congress for that pur-
pose. Transportation Act, 1920, Sec. 206 (e). 
The attempt on July 23rd, 1928, more than eight years 
after the instit~ttion of the action, to obtain jurisdiction over 
it by amendment to the declaration so as to name John Bar-
ton Payne in his official capacity as ''agent designated by the 
President, etc.", 'vas, therefore, a nullity, since no new party 
may ever be brought into an action without the issuance and 
service of process against him, which was not done and could 
not have been lawfully done in the instant case at that time, 
because the two-years period provided by Section 206a of 
the Transportation Act ,vithin which actions based on causes 
of action accruing during Federal control might have been 
instituted against John Barton Payne ''as Agent'', had long 
sinae expired. 
(c) It is i1nmaterial tl~(J;t process against John Barton 
Payne, u Director General of Railroads", was served upo1t 
the same person upon ~ohom it wo·uld have been served had· 
he been 'sued as u agent designated by the President, etc." 
By Section 206b of the Transportation A.ct of 1920, it is 
provided that in any action instituted against ''an agent desig-
nated by the President", under Section 206a of the Act, that 
"Process may be served upon any agent or officer of the 
carrier operating such railroad or system of transportation, 
· if such agent or officer is authorized by law to be served by 
process in proceedin~s brought against such carrier, etc." 
The process in the instant case was served by the sheriff 
of Norfolk County by "delivering the true copy thereof to 
George A. McGee, Agent of the Southern Railway Com-
pany,. where he resides"· If the suit had been instituted 
against ''John Barton Payne, Director General of Railroads 
and Agent designated by the President'', the summons might 
· have, therefore, been lawfully served. upon the same person 
as he upon whom it was served. This fact, however, does 
not serve to prevent the application of the principle an-
nounced in the foregoing authorities that the office of "Direc-
tor General of Railroads" and that of "Agent designated by 
the President'' under Section 206a of the Transportation Act 
are separate and distinct; that a suit against the incumbent 
of one office was not in effect a suit against him in the other, 
16 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
although process might be served upon the same person in 
order to properly obtain jurisdiction against him in both 
official capacities. 
· In Davis, Agent, v. Cohen & Company, Inc., 268 U. S. 638, 
the court said : . · 
''And it is immaterial that, as admitted at bar, the service 
of the writ against the Railroad Company was made upon 
a clerk upon whom process against the Director General might 
have been served if the suit had been brought against him. 
'The Federal agent was not bound to take cognizance of an 
action against the railroad corporation, even th (}Ugh the 
service was on the same local station agent, and even thou.~h 
the complainant stated a cause of ~ction for personal injuries 
sustained during government control.' Davis v. Chrisp, 159 
Ark. 335, 343. · · 
It results that the provisions of the Massachusetts General 
Laws under which the plaintiff was a.llowed to amend the writ 
and declaration so as to substitute the designated Agent as 
the defendant instead of the Railroad Company, al:! construed 
and applied in the present case, are void because of repug-
nancy to Sec. 206 of the Transportation Act. 
The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed, and .the 
cause remanded to that court for further proceedings not in-
consistent with this opinion.'' · 
CONCLUSION. 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the attempted 
bringing in of John Barton Payne, ''as Agent of the Presi-
dent'' by the order of July 23, 1928, was in effect the com-
mencement of a new and independent action against him to 
enforce the liability of the Government and since that could 
not be legally accomplished more than two years after the 
adoptiot:t of the Transpor.tation Act of 1920, the judgment 
rendered in this case is a nullity. . 
Your petitioner adopts this petition as its opening brief. 
Wherefore. your petitioner respectfully prays that for its 
e;~ors i~ refusi~g to dismiss the action against your ne-
titroner, In allowing the amendment to the declaration in the 
manner aforesaid, in refusing to set aside the verdict as con·. 
trary to law and the evidence, and in refusing 'f:o enter judg-
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ment for your petitioner on the evidence in accordance witll 
the statute in such case made and provided, a writ of error 
and s~tpersedeas be allowed in this case, and that the judg-
ment of the trial court may be reviewed, reversed and judg-
ment entered herein by this Honorable Court for your pe-
titioner in accordance with the statute in such case made and 
provided. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN BARTON PAYNE, 
Director General of Railroads and Agent desig-
nated by the President, etc., Petitioner. 
By THOMAS B. GAY, 
WM. LEIGH WILLIAMS, 
Counsel for Petitioner. 
I, Thomas B. Gay, an attorney and counsellor at law·, 
duly licensed to practice in the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia, do hereby certify that in my opinion it is proper 
that the decision in the above entitled action be reviewed and 
reversed by this Honorable Court. 
THOM ... t\.S B. GAY . 
. Received November 19, 1928. 
Writ of error allowed; supersedeas awarded. Bond, $500. 
ROBER-T R. PRENTIS. 
Received Nov. 19, 1928. 
II. S. J. 
APPENDIX. 
-Transportation Act of 1920, Section 206( a), and pertinent 
portions of Section 206 (b) and Section 206 (e) : 
206( a). Actions at" la,v, suits in equity, and proceedin~s 
in admiralty, based on causes of action arising· out of the 
possession, use, or operation by the President of the railroad 
or system of transportation of any carrier (under the pro-
visions of the Federal Control Act, or the Act of August 
29, 1916) of such character as prior to Federal control could 
18 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
have been brought against such carrier, may, after the termi-
nation of Federal control, ·be brought against an agent desig':' 
nated by the President for such purpose, which agent shall 
be designated by the President within thirty days after the 
passage of this Act. Such actions, suits or proceedings may, 
within the periods of limitation now prescribed by State or 
Federal statutes, but not later than two years from the date 
of the passage of this Act, be brought in any court which but 
for Federal control would have had jurisdiction of the cause 
of action had it arisen against such carrier. 
206 (b). Process may be served upon any agent or officer 
of the carrier operating such railroad or system of trans-
portation, if such agent or officer is authorized by law to be 
served with process in proceedings brought against such car-
rier and if a· contract has been made with such carrier by 
or through the President for the conduct of litigation arising 
out of operation during Federal control. =~t * * 
206 (e). Final judgments, decrees, and awards in actions, 
suits, proceedings, or reparation claims, of the character 
above described, rendered against the agent designated by 
the President under subdivision (a), shall be promptly paid 
out of the revolving fund created by section 210. 
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AJ\fERICA-A PROCLA~tfATION. 
Whereas Section 206 of the Act approved February 29, 
1920, entitled ''An Act to provide for the termination of 
Federal control of railroads and systems of transportation 
to provide for the settlement of disputes between carriers 
and their employees; to further amend an ... 1\.ct entitled 'An 
Act to regulate commerce', approved February 4, 1887, as 
amended, and for other purposes", provides that tl1e Presi-
dent shall within thirty (30) days after the passag-e of said 
Act designate an agent against whom shall be brought actions 
at law, suits in equity, and proceedin~s in admiralty, based 
on causes of action arising out of the possession, use, or 
operation by the President of the railroad or system of trans-
portation of any carrier (under the provisions of the Federal 
Control Act, or of the Act of August 29, 1916) of such char-
acter as prior to Federal control could have been brought 
against such carrier. · 
Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President_ of the 
United States, under and by virtue of the power and au-
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thority so vested in me by said Act, and of all other powers 
me hereto enabling, do hereby designate and appoint Walker 
D. Hines, Director General of Railroads, and his successor 
in office, as the agent provided for in Section 206 of said .Act, 
approved February 28, 1920. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. 
Done bv the President in the District of Columbia this 
eleventh day of ~{arch, in the year of our Lord, Nineteen 
Hundred and Twenty, and of the Independence of the United 
~tates the One Hundred and Forty-fourth. 
WOODROW WILSON. 
(Seal) 
By the President: 
FRANK L. POLK, 
Acting Secretary of State. 
BY TilE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
A.1'IERICA-A PR.OCLAMATION. 
Whereas Walker D. Hines has tendered his resignation 
as Director General of Railroads to become effective the 18th 
day of May, 1920; and 
Whereas such resignation has been accepted effective as 
of such date : 
Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the 
United States, under and by virtue of the power and· au-
thority so vested in me under the Transportation Act of 1920. 
the unrepealed provisions of the Federal Control Act of 
~farch 2;1, 1918, and the "Act making appropriations for 
the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 
30, 1917, and for other purposes", approved Aug-ust 29, 1916, 
and of all other powers me hereto enabling, do hereby ap-
point, effective the 18th.day of May, 1920, John Barton Payne, 
of Illinois, Director General of Railroadsjn the stead of the 
said Walker D. Hines. and do hereby delegate to and con-
tinue and confirm in him all powers and authority hereto-
fore granted to and now possessed by the said Walker D. 
Hines as Director General of Railroads; and do hereby au-
thorize and direct the said John Barton Payne, or his suc-
cessor in office until otherwise provided by Proclamation of 
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the President or by Act of Congress, either personally or 
through such divisions, agencies, or persons as he may au-
thorize, to e~ercise and perform, as fully in all respects ns 
the President is authorized to do, all and singular the powers 
and duties conferred or imposed upon me by the said un-
repealed provisions of the Federal Control Act of March 21, 
1918, and the said Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, 
except the designation of the Agent under Section 206 there-
of. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
caused the seal of the ·United States to be affixed. 
Done by the President in the District of Columbia this 
14th day of }Jfay. in the year of our Lord, Nineteen Hundred 
and Twenty, and of the Independence of the United States 
the One Hundred and For~y-fourth. 
(Seal) 
By the President: 
BAINB.RIDGE COLBY, 
Secretary of State. 
WOODROW WILSON. 
BY THE PR.ESIDENT OF TliE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA-A PROCLAlVIATION. 
Whereas by Proclamation dated J\tfarch 11th, 1920, Walker 
D. Hines, Director General of Railroads, was designated 
as the Agent provided for in Section 206 of the Transpor-
tation Act, 1920; and 
Whereas the said Walker D. Hines, Director General of 
Railroads as aforesaid has tendered his resignation as said 
Agent, which has been duly accepted, effective as of 18 J\1:ay, 
1920: 
Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson,, President of the 
United States, under and by virtue of the power and au-
thority v~sted in me by said Act, and of all other powers me 
hereto enabling, do hereby designate and appoint, effectiv~ 
the 18th day of May, 1920, John Barton Payne, Director 
General of Railroads, and his successor in office, as the Agent 
provided for in Section 206 of said Act, approved Feb-
ruary 28, 1920. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. 
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14th day of May; in the year of our Lord, Nineteen Hun-
dred and Twenty, and of the Independence of the United 
States the One Hundred and Forty-fourth. 
(Seal) 
By the President: 
BAINBRID·GJD COLBY, 
Secretary of State. 
VIRGINIA: 
WOODROW WILSON. 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of Norfolk County, at 
the Court house of said County, on the 14th day of August, 
1928. 
BE IT RE~:fE:T!.tiBERED. that heretofore, to-wit: At rules 
held in the Clerk's Office of said Court, on the third Monday 
in July, 1920, came the plaintiff, L. J. Upton & Company., 
Incorporated, and filed its declaration· in the suit then pend-
ing against John Barton Payne, Director General of Rail-
roads, Walker D. Hines, Formerly Director General of Rail-
roads and Southern Railway Company, a Corporation, in the 
words and figures following, to-wit: 
L. J. Upton and Company, Incorporated, a Corporation, 
vs. 
John Barton Payne. Director General of Railroads, Walker 
D. Hines, formerly Director General of R.ailroads, and 
Southern Railway Company, a Corporation. 
TRESPASS ON THE CASE. 
L. J. Upton and Company, Incorporated, a Corporation 
created under the laws of the State of ·virginia, complains 
of John Barton Payne, Director General of Railroads, Wal-
ker D. Hines. formerly Director General of Railroads, and 
Southern Railway Company. a Corporation created under 
the laws of sajd State, of a plea of trespass on 
page 2 ~ the case, for this, to-wit: 
That heretofore, to-wit, on the 26th day of June, 1918, 
the defendants, in connection with other carriers owned and 
operated, as a common carrier of goods for hire, a railroad 
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from Boone, in the State of Virginia, to New York, in the 
State of New York. And, the defendants being such car-
riers, the plaintiff, ·on the 26th da.y of June, 1918, caused to 
be aelivered to the defendants, at Boone, 486 baskets and 
one barr~l of cucumbers, and 16 barrels of potatoes, the prop-
erty of the plaintiff, the same beinp: in good condition, for 
transportation, from Boone to N e'v York. And the defend-
ants then and there accepted the said produce for such trans-
portation. It thereupon became and was th~ duty of the 
defendants and of the said connecting c.arriers to do every-
thing reasonably within their power for the proper care and 
preservation of said produce, and also to do everything 
r~asonably within their power to facilitate the transportation 
of the same from Boone to N e'v York within a reasonable time. 
But neither the defendants nor the said connecting carriers 
performed its or their duty in the premises. On the con-
trary, owing to the negligence and improper conduct of the 
defendants, and of the said connecting carriers, the said 
produce was g-reatly delayed in reaching New York, and did 
not arrive there until the 2nd day of ,July, 1918, whereas, had 
it been ·transported with reasonable dispatch, it could and 
'vould have arrived there on the 28th day of ,June, 1918; and, 
moreover. the said produce was greatly injured and 
page 3 r damaged by said delay, as well as by other negli-
gence and improper conduct on the part of the de-
fendants and the said connecting carriers. A.nd the plaintiff 
says that the market value of produce of the same kind as t11at 
in question, in good condition, in Ne'v York, on the day on 
which the latter should and would have arrived there, had 
it been transported with reasonable dispatch. was greater 
than the market value of such produce in good condition on 
the 2nd day of July, 1918; so that, when the said produce 
reached New York, on the last named day, it only brought 
$768.75, 'vhereas, had it been transported with reasonable 
dispatch, and arrived in good condition, it would easily have 
brought $1,034.00. And, moreover, the said defendants, and 
the said connecting carriers, compelled the said plaintiff to 
pay for said transportation $89.14 in excess of the legal rate 
for the same. And so the plaintiff says that it has been 
damaged by the negligence and improper conduct of the de-
fendants and said connecting carriers. 
AND FOR TIDS ALSO, TO-WIT: That heretofore, to-
wit, on the 2nd day of July, 1919, the defendants, in connec-
tion with other carriers, owned and operated, as a common 
carrier of goods for hire, a railroad from Kingman, in the 
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State of Virginia, to Ne'v York, in the State of New York. 
And, the defendants being such -carriers, the plaintiff, on 
the 2nd day of July, 1919, caused to be delivered to the de-
fendants, at Kingman, 56 barrels of potato.es, and four bar-
rels and one basket of cucumbers, the property of the plain-
tiff, the same being in good condition, for transpor-
page 4 ~ tation from J{:ingman to New York. And the de-
fendants then and there accepted the said produce 
for such transportation. It thereupon became and was the 
duty of the defendants and of the said connecting carriers, 
to do everything reasonably within their power for the proper 
care and preservation of the said produce, and also to do 
everything reasonably within their power to facilitate the 
transportation of the same from Kingman to New York with-
in a reasonable time. But neither the defendants nor the 
said connecting carriers performed its or their duty in the 
premises. On the contrary, owing to the negligence and im-
-proper conduct of the defendants, and the said connecting 
carriers, the said produce 'vas greatly delayed in reaching 
New York, and did not arrive there until the 7th day of 
July, 1919, whereas, had it been transported with reasonable 
dispatch, it could and would have arrived there on the 5th 
day of July. 1919; and. moreover. the said produce was greatly 
injured and damaged by said delay, as well as by other neg-
ligence and improper conduct on the part of the defendants 
and the said connecting carriers. And the plaintiff says that 
the market value of produce of the same kind as that in ques-
tion, in good condition, in New York, on the day on which 
the latter should and would have arrived there, had it been 
transported with reasonable dispatch, was greater than the 
· market value of such produce in good condition, on the 7tb 
day of J u1y, 1919; so that, when the said produce reached 
New York, on the last named day, it only brought $236.25, 
whereas, had it been transported with reasonable 
page 4 ~ dispatch, and arrived in good condition, it would 
easily have brought $323.75. And so the plaintiff 
says that it has been damaged by the said negligence and 
improper doncut of the defendants and the said connecting 
carriers. 
To the damage of the plaintiff $1,000.00. 
AND, THERE~ORE, it brings its suite. 
JAMES E. HEATH, p. q. 
24 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
And at another day, to-wit: On the 4th day of October, 
1920, the following order was entered: 
L. J. Upton & Company, Inc., Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Southern Railway Company, a Corp., Defendant. 
This day came the plaintiff by counsel, and the defendant 
appeared by 'Villiams, Loyall and Tunstall, its 1\.ttorneys, 
and pleaded "not guilty", to which the plaintiff replied gen-
erally, and on which plea issue is joined. 
And at another day, to-wit: On the 7th day of June, 1926, 
the foll9wing order was entered: 
L. ;J. Upton & Company, Inc., Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Southern Railway Company, a Corp., Defendant. 
This day came the defendant by its Attorney and moved 
the Court to dismiss this case upon the ground of 'vrong 
joinder of this part defendant, the heanng of which 
page 6 ~ motion is continued. 
And at another day, to-wit: On the 11th day of June, 1926, 
the following order was entered: 
This day came again the parties by their Attorneys, and 
the Court having fully heard the motion of the defendant 
to dismiss this case, doth take time to consider of its judg- . 
ment. 
And at another day, to-wit: On the 23rd day of July, 1928, 
the following order was entered: 
L. J. Upfon & Company, Inc., Plaintiff, 
vs. 
John B.arton Payne, Agent operating Southern Railway Com-
pany, Defendant. 
This day came again the parties by their Attorneys, and 
by consent of parties, it is ordered that .this case ne tried 
at this term of Court. Thereupon without waiving his motion 
to ?ismiss th~s ~nit, th~ defendant pleaded "not guilty", to 
~h~c~ the pla1nbff rephed generall:y and on which plea issue 
IS JOined; and the Court having fully heard and considered 
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the motion of the defendant to dismiss this suit, doth over 
rule the same. Thereupon came a Jury, to-wit: C. B. Varice, 
W. L. Matthews, R. V. ~foulton, T .. B. Tuttle, B. E. Andrews, 
J. E. Tyus and W. E. Carey, who were duly sworn the truth 
to speak upon the issue joined, and after having fully heard 
the evidence and argument of Counsel, retired to 
page 7 ~ their room to consult of a verdict, and after some 
· time returned into Court, having found the follow-
ing verdict: ''We, the Jury, find for the plaintiff and assess 
its damages at $242.00, with interest thereon from the 28th 
day of June, 1918." 
Thereupon the defendant moved the Court to set aside the 
verdict of the Jury in this case and enter up judgment for 
the defendant. u-pon tl1e ground that the same is contrary 
to the law and the evidence, the hearing of which motion is 
continued. 
- And at another day, to-wit: On the 26th day of July, 
1928, the following order 'vas entered: 
This day came again the parties by their Attorneys, and 
the Court having fully heard and considered the motion of 
the defendant to set aside the verdict of the Jury in t1, 
case and grant him a new trial, doth overrule the same. 
Thereupon it is considered by the Court that the plaintiff 
recover against the defendant, the sum of Two Hundred and 
Forty-two Dollars ($242.00), with interest thereon from the 
28th day of June, 1928, until paid and its costs in this behalf 
exnended, to which action of the Court in overruling- said 
motion and in entering up judgment for the plaintiff, the 
defendant by Counsel, excepted. And on motion of the said 
defendant, who desires to apply to the Supreme Court of the 
United States for a writ of error to said judgment, execution 
thereof is suspended for a period of sixty _days from 
page 8 ~ this date, upon the defendant. or some one for hin1 
entering· into and acknowledging a suspending bond 
in the penalty of One Thousand Dollars- ($1,000.00), before 
the Clerk of this Court, with surety approved by the said 
Clerk, and conditioned according to law. 
And at anotl1er day, to-wit: On the 14th day of August, 
1928, the following order 'vas entered: 
This day came the .parties by their Attorneys, and within 
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the tinie prescribed by law., the above named defendant ten-
dered his bills of exception Nos. 1 and 2. 
And it appearing to the Court that the plaintiff has had 
reasonable notice of the time and place at which said bills 
of exception were to be tendered to the Court, the same are 
signed, sealed and made a part of the record in this case. 
The following are the Bills of Exceptions referred to in 
the foregoing orde~: 
BILL OF EXCEPTION NUl\fBER ONE. 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 23rd day of July, 
1928, and before the trial on the merits had been commenced, 
it was agreed both by counsel for the plaintiff and for the 
defendants that this action was commenced on the lOth day 
of June, 1920, and was for a cause of action arising during· 
the oneration of the Southern Railway Company by the Fed-
eral Government, and that on the 14th day of 1\fay, 1920, 
the President appointed John Barton Payne as 
page 9 ~ agent provided for in Section 206 of tbe Trans-
portation Act of 1920, and that at that time John 
Barton Payne had also been appointed Director General of 
R.ailroads, and thereupon the defendants, by counsel, moved 
the Court to dismiss the action as to each and all of them, 
and thereupon counsel for the plaintiff moved the Court to 
be allowed to amend his declaration by adding to the words 
''Director General of R.ailroads'' the words ''and the Agent 
designated by the President under the terms of Section 206 
of the Transportation Act of 1920", and the Court thereupon 
dismissed the said action as to ·wall{er D. Hines, formerly 
Director General of R.ailroads, and as to tJ1e Soutllern Rail-
way Comnanv, but overruled the motion to dismiss the action 
as to John B.arton Payne, Director General of Railroads, 
and ordered the declaration to be amended by inserting nfter 
the words· ''John Barton Payne, Director General of Rail-
roads", the 'vords and also "Agent designated by the Presi-
dent under the terms of Section 206 of the Transportation 
Act of 1920", and thereupon John Barton Payne, as Agent 
desi~nated by the President under the terms of Section 206 
of the Transportation Act of Congress of 1920, moved the 
Court to dismiss said action as to him, which motion the 
Court overn1led, and to the action of the Court in refusing 
to dismiss the action as to all of the original defendants, and 
in permitting the declaration to be amended, as set out, and 
in refusing to dismiss the action as to John Barton Payne, 
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Agent designated by the President under the terms of Sec-
tion 206 of the Transportation Act of 1920, the last 
page 10 ~ named defendant duly excepted, and prays that this 
its Bill of Exceptions No. 1 may be signed, sealed 
and made a part of the record, and the same is accordingly 
done. 
This the 23rd .day of July, 1928. 
C. W. COLEMAN, Judge, (Seal) 
DEFENDANTS' BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NUMBER TWO. 
BE IT REMEMBERED·, that on the trial of this action, 
the following evidence, including the exhibits therein men-
tioned, on behalf of the plaintiff and defendant, respectively 
as hereinafter denoted, was introduced and the same was all 
the evidence introduced for the plaintiff and the defendant: 
page 11 ~ Mr. Williams: Counsel for John Barton Payne, 
Director General of Railroads and also agent 
designated by the President in pursuance of Section 206 af 
the Act of Congress lmown as the Transportation Act of 
1920, without waiving the motion to dismiss, now pleads 
the general issue. 
J\ilr. Heath: I introduce in evidence what is admitted to 
be a copy of the bill of lading covering this shipment (marked 
plaintiff's exhibit No. 1). It is admitted that the railroad 
records show that this shipment reached New York and was 
delivered July 2, 1918, as per the letter from R. L. Franklin, 
Freight Claim Agent (marked plaintiff's exhibit No. 2). 
A. S. HARGROVE, 
being first duly sworn, testified on behalf of the plaintiff 
as follows: 
mxamined by 1\tlr. Heath: 
Q. Your name is A. S. Hargrove 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are a farmer out in Norfolk County? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you in 1918 operating a farm for L. J. Upton & 
Co.? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are you still operating that farm? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Did the shipment of cucumbers and potatoes covered 
. by this bill of lading go from your farm Y 
page 12 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. They were shipped from B.oone? 
A. The Boone farm. 
Q. That is the farm of Upton's that you were operating 
thenY 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. And are still operating 1 
A. I operate several. That is one of them that I opera ted. 
I operated it then and operate it now. 
Q. Are you familiar with the schedule which the railroad 
company made between Boone and New York in the year· 
1918? 
A. Second morning delivery. 
Q. That is if it left here ·on the 26th of ,June for what mar-
ket ought it to have reached New York? 
A. For the 28th, the same as we do now. 
Q. Was that schedule kept in effect by the railroads 
th.roughout the year 1918 Y 
A. I think so. 
Q. Is that the best of your recollection 'that it was' 
A. Yes, sir. I don't know of anything to the contrary. I 
don't know of any time that that schedule hasn't been in effect, 
so far as I know. 
Q. So far as you know it was in existence then and has been 
in existence since ; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are continually making shipments to New York, are 
you not, from Boone? 
page 13 ~ A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Yon, of course, can't recall that you ever 
saw this particular shipment? 
A. No, sir, I don't say I could remember the morning that 
car went away personally. · 
Q. Was your stuff in good condition or bad condition wh<m 
you shipped it? 
Mr. Williams: I object to establishing a custom. 
The Court: If he testifies that he shipped all of his stuff 
in good condition, I think it is proper. 
By Mr. Heath: 
Q. What practice did you make with regard to shipment~ 
from your farm? · · 
.. 
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Mr. Williams : I must object. The question is he is try-
ing to show what 'vas the condition of the potatoes at the 
time they were shipped. He can't show that by showing a 
custom or practice . 
. The Court: I believe that is right. If he can testify that 
he shipped those potatoes in proper shape-
Yr. Heath: This was eight years ago and a man couldn't 
be supposed to remember any specific shipment. 
The Court: If he can testify that he shipped all of his stuff 
in good shape. ' 
page 14 ~By Mr. Heath: 
. Q. Did you ship any stuff in the year 1918 in 
bad shape? 
1\fr. Williams: I must make objection to that question. I 
submit the question is what was the condition of these po-. 
tatoes at the time they were shipped. 
The Court: There is no question about that. The only 
question is whether or not Mr. Hargrove has enough knowl-
edge-
Mr. Heath: In other words, if he can give any information 
as to the condition of this shipment. I will withdraw the 
question. 
By Mr. Heath: 
Q. If cucumbers or potatoes were in bad condition, would 
that be evident to anybody who was in contact with them? 
A.. Absolutely. · 
Q. What would make it soY . 
A.. Well, the odor of potatoes would make it so if you didn't 
look in the barrel. 
Q. How about cucumbers 1 
A.. Anybody accustomed to seeing this stuff and handling-
it at all could at a glance tell whether it is in good condition 
or not. 
Q. I repeat the question, did you allow anything that war-; 
in bad condition or that was not in first class condition to 
leave your farm for shipment? · 
page 15 r A.. we did not. 
1\fr. Williams: I object to that question upon the ground 
that it is entirely too general, that it has no reference to tlH~ 
potatoes or cucumbers in questions and permits the witness 
simply, on account of the general practice, to establish a 
condition of specific articles. 
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The Court: ·The question is as to the condition of this par~ 
ticular shipment. If Mr. Hargrove has sufficient information 
as to which he can testify to that, I think he can show it. If 
he knows he did not ship any cucumbers that were bad or bad 
potatoes, then these must not have been. 
By the Court: 
Q. Are you able to show that these cucumbers and potatoes 
that you shipped were in good condition 1 
A. No, sir, I don't remember but I do know that we are 
very careful about what we ship. At that time of the year 
these are the very first cucumbers that we are able to ship 
and usually they are the best we have. 
Mr. Williams : I couldn't ·well object to the question put 
by your Honor, but I deem it my duty to move to strilre out 
the answer which I suppose your Honor will overrule and I 
desire to except. 
page 16 ~ The Court: His answer is not sufficient. I sus-
tain the motion 1\fr. Williams makes. It ts neces-
sary for him to he able to know in some 'vay that the ship-
ment was in good condition. 
A. Your Honor, I couldn't testify what happened in 1918. 
I don't remember that specific case when I am shipping· cars 
every day but I do kno·w that we are very careful and have 
to be, as much stuff as we handle, about the class and con-
dition of the stuff that goes in these cars. 
Mr. Williams: I move to strike out that testimony. 
The Court: I don't know· about striking out that but if 
that is all he can say, the answer is stricken out. Unless he 
is able in some way to say that this shipment was in good 
condition, he can't testify to it. 
A. I can say if it 'vasn 't in good condition it wouldn't have 
been loaded. 
By Mr. Heath: 
· Q. If it had been in anything but good condition would the 
railroad agent have noted it on the billY 
Mr. Williams: That seems to me to be going far afield. 
· That assumes some kind of practice or habit but overlooks 
tl~e idea that people don't always do what their duty requires 
them to do. 
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page 17 r CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Williams : 
Q. That was during the war 1 
A. The year the war closed, I belie.ve, as well as I remem-
ber. 
Q. Don't you lmow that it was in July, 1918' 
A. Yes, sir, the shipment was in June. 
Q. That the Pennsylvania Railroad was so crowded with 
business that they couldn't possibly handle it under two or 
three days in New York Y 
A~ No, sir, I did not. . 
Q. Didn't you have an immense amount of trouble on that 
account in getting stuff out on the pier for the market Y 
A. We had some delays but usually the perishable stuff 
always went through. 
L. M. NORMAN, 
being first duly sworn, testified on behalf of the plaintiff as 
follows: 
Examined by Mr. Heath: 
Q. Your name is L. 1\.L Norman? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are Traffic Manager for L. J. Upton & Company 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And have been since 1918 t 
A. 1917. 
page 18 } Q. Mr. Norman, at my request, you took from 
the books of Upton & Company the priees which 
the cucumbers and potatoes insolved here brought, did you 
not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you read that to the jury? They are taken from 
the ori!tinal books of Upton & Company, are they not1 
A. Yes, sir. 
1\fr. Williams: I doubt very much if what the potatoes 
potatoes brought is the proper measure of damage. ~{y un-
derstanding of the law about it is that you show the potatoes 
in good condition 'vhen they left here, if you can. You as-
sume they were in good condition when they got there or 
.at the time they should have gotten there and the measure 
of damage is the difference in market price between what 
it would have been on the day they should have gotten there 
and the market price on the day they were actually delivered. 
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I doubt very much if particular sales of these particular goods 
is evidence. I am inclined to think that the true measure 
of dan;1age is the market price on the day when tney should 
have got there as compared with the market pr1ce on the 
day they did get there and the difference between those two 
things is the measure of damage, not the specific transaction 
because the man might not have gotten the proper 
page 19 }- market price. 
Mr. Heath: We couldn't in any event ask for 
any more than the difference between what we got and wh,tt 
we should have gotten. It might be that the illarket price 
would turn out to have been varied. It isn't an absolute 
quantity. It will range, we will say,. from $2 to $2.50. If, 
as a matter of fact, we got $2.25 or $2.35 for ours, we wouldn ,t 
be entitled to claim the difference between $2 and $2.50 
simply because that was the difference ·between the market 
price. Our loss is the difference between what we g-ot and 
the market price on the day "rhen the shipment should have 
p:otten there. It is imnortant for us to show what ·we got for 
these potatoes in order to show what their condition was. 
Your Honor has ruled out the testimonv which I have sought 
to introduce· as to the knowledge of these gentlemen as to 
·what condition this shipment was in but if it appears. for 
instance. that the market price on ,July 2 was $2 to $2.50 per 
basket (J cite that by illustration). and it appears that the 
market price for cucumbers was $2 to $2.50 and these cucum-
bers broup:ht the top of the market price or brought near the 
market price. that of itself is evident of the condition they 
were in in New York and neeessarily they must have been 
in just as g-ood, condition or better condition when they left 
Virginia so that for both reasons, to show that 
pa.ge 20 ~ these cucumbers brought over the market price or. 
brought the top of the market price is important 
for us in order to show the condition of the shipment and 
it is only fair tQ the defendant because in no event are 've 
entitled to any more than the difference between what we 
got and what we should have gotten. . 
The Court : I think you can do that. 
By Mr. Heath: 
· Q. What did these cucnmlJcrs bring in New York on the 
2nd of July? 
A. 350 baskets sold for $1.50 per basket. 134 sold for· 
$1.37%. One barrel of cucumbers sold for $3.50, 16 barrels 
#2 potatoes $3.50 a barrel. . 
Q. Do yon kno'v what· schedule was in effect between. 
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Boone, Virginia, and New York throughout the summer of 
1918 for perishable shipments Y 
A. Second morning delivery. 
Q. This shipment it appears left Boone on the 26th of June,· 
according to the schedule maintained when should it have 
reached New York Y 
A. It should have· arrived in N e"\v York in time for the 
market on the 28th. 
Q. Do you know anything about a publication in New York 
called The Producers Price Current? 
A. Yes, sir, it shows the prices of sales actually 
page 21 ~ made in New York. . 
Q. Is that publication relied upon generally by 
the tradeY 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Are its reports considered as accurate as any that can 
be obtained ~ · 
A. The most accurate reports you can get, so far as I know. 
Mr. Heath: I "\vant to introduce the market reports for 
the days beginning June 28 and ending July 2. On June 
28 the market .price in New York for cucumbers was as fol-
lows: Virginia, per large basket, $1.50 to $2.00, per small 
basket $1.25 to '$1.75. Virginia #2 potatoes $2.25 -to $3.25. 
Cucumbers per barrel $4.00 to $6.QO. June 29: Virginia cucum-
bers, June 29, large basket, $1.25 to $2.00. Small basket $1.00 
to $1.75, cucumbers per barrel, $4.00 to $6.00. Virginia #2 
potatoes $3.00 to $5.00. 
By Mr. Heath: 
Q. Were these #1 potatoes or #2 potatoes? 
A. #2 potatoes. 
Mr. Heath: June 30 was Sunday. July 1, the prices were 
as follows: Cucmp.bers, Virginia, large basket, $1.00 to $1.75, 
small basket, $1.00 to $1. 75. Per barrel $3.00 to $5 . .00. Po-
tatoes, #2 Virginia, $2.50 to $4.50. July 2, cucumbers Vir-
ginia, per large basket $1.00 to $1.50, small basket $. 75 to 
$1.25. Per barrel $3.00 to. $4.00. Potatoes, Virginia #2, 
per barrel, $2.00 to $3.00. · 
page 22 ~ CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Williams: 
Q. Mr. Norman, did you ever hear of any bad congestion 
on the Pennsylvania piers during the time of this shipment 1 
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A. I don't remember. 
Q. 'Vasn't it a matter of common kno"rledge t11at during 
the war the Pennsylvania piers 'vere so crowded that it took 
two or three days to get them from Jersey City over to tne 
market? 
A. I don't kno,v. There must have been som!3 reason for 
the delay but I don't know. I can't answer that. 
By Mr. Heath: 
Q. If there was any unnecessary delay did the agent notify 
you of it in regard to this shipment? 
A. No. 
And the defendant offered in evidence the original sum-
mons, defendants' exhibit No. 1, and this was all the evidence 
introduced during the trial. 
And be it further remembered that the defendant asked 
the Court to i~struct the Jury as follows: 
page 23 ~ The follo,ving instruction 'vas offered by the 
defendant and refused: 
The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that at the time the sun11mon was served in this 
action that John Barton Payne as the agent designated bv 
the President under the· terms of Section 206 of the Act 
of Congress known as the Transportation Act of 1920 as 
the person a.rrainst 'vhom action should be broug-ht for causes 
of action arising during federal control of the r&ilroa.ds, 
and that this action did arise during such federal control, 
and that the summons in this action ·was sued out against 
.Tohn Barton PHyne, Director General of Railroads, then the 
action was not brought according· to the terms of the statute 
nnd von sl1ould find your verdic.t for the defendant. Mr. Williams: Under the rules of the Supreme Court we 
have to state our grounds. I desire to except to the ruling 
of the court in refusing- the instruction asked for by the de·-
fendant and the grounds of the exception are that the facts 
stated in the instruction sho,v. as a. matter of la,v, that the 
Ruit was not properly brought, it having been brought against 
.T ohn Barton Pavne, Director General of R.ailroads, when in 
fact and in truth it should have been brought against John 
Barton Payne, agent designated by the President upon whom 
service of summons should be directed according to 
page 24 ~ Section 206 of the Transportation Act of 1920 for 
railroads. 
causes of action arising during federal control of 
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The Court: It appears in the record that it was, in fact, 
served on John Barton Payne. 
Mr. Williams : The 'vay this summons reads, c 'You are 
hereby commanded to summon John Barton Payne, Director 
General of Railroads, Walker D. Hines, formerly Director 
General of Railroads, Southern Railway Company, a . cor-
poration", and when they came to serve it, the sheriff served 
it this way: "Not finding any official of the Southern Rail-
way Company within my jurisdiction upon whom service 
could be obtained, executed in the County of Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, this 11th day of ~fay, 1920, by delivering a copy thereof 
to George A. Magee, Agent of the Southern Railway Com-
pany where he resides. A. A. Wen dell, sheriff,'' etc. 
The Court: Isn't he the person upon whom it should have 
been served if it had been brought against John Barton 
Payne, agent? 
Mr. Williams: Yes, sir. I want to offer in evidence this 
summons. 
And be it further remembered that no other instruction 
was asked for, and thereupon the Jury retired and after-
time returned a verdict as follows:· ''We the Jury find for 
the plaintiff and assess its damages at $242.00 with interest 
from J nne 28th, 1928, till paid.'' 
page 25 ~ And thereupon Counsel for the defendant moved 
the Court to set aside the verdict and enter up 
judgment in favor of the defendant and the grounds of this 
motion are that the suit was improperly brought against 
John Barton Payne, Director General of Railroads, when, 
in fact. and in truth, it could only have been brought against 
.John Barton Payne, agent designated under Section 206 of 
the Act of Congress known as the Transportation Act of 
1920. and upon the further ground that the evidence in this 
case is not sufficient to show that the potatoes were in good 
condition at the time when they were shipped and therefore 
there isn't sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict; and the 
Court overruled the said motion and the defendant by coun-
sel then and there excepted to the said ruling of the .court in 
refusing to set aside said verdict and in refusing to enter up 
judgment for the defendant. And the said defendant tenders 
this hill of exceptions after reasonable notice in writing of the 
time and -place thereof to plaintiff's counsel as required 'by 
la,v, which it prays may be signed, sealed and made a part 
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-of fhe record which is accordingly done this the 14th day 
of August, 1~28, and within the time allowed by law. 
C. W. COLEMAN, (Seal) 
Judge, Circuit Court of Norfolk County. 
r. 
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-page 26 ~ PLAINTIFF'S EXHilHT No. 1 
12-19-22. 2,000 M sets. D 1543 Form 407 
Uniform Domestic Straight Bill of Lading1 Adopted by Carriers in Official, Southern and Western Cla.'iSifica!icn Terd'cries, Mar<'h 15, 1922. 
UNIFORM STRAIGHT BILL OF LADING Shipper's-No ________ ............ .. 
(Prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission) 
ORIGINAL-NOT NEGOTIABLE Agent's No. ___________ ........... . 
SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY 
RECEIVED, subject to the cla.c;.qifications and tariffs in effect on the date of the issue of this Bill of La.dir.g, 
at.--------·--······----BOONE STATION, VA., June 26, 1918 _____ ............................................................................................................................................. 192 ....... . 
from .................... L. J. Upton st.nd Company ........................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
the property described below, in apparent good order, except as noted (contents and condition of contents of packages unknown), marked, consig.ced, 
and destined as indicated below, which said company (the word company bei1 g understood throughout this contract as meaning any person or corpora-
tion in possession of the property under the contract) agrees to carry to its usual place of delivery at said destination, if on its own road or its own water 
line, otherwise to deliver to another carrier on the route to said destination. It is mutually agreed, as to each carrier of aU or any of said property over 
all or any portion of said route to destination, ar.d as to each party at any time interested in all or any of said property, that every service to b~ per-
formed hereunder shall be subject to all the conditions not prohibited by law, whether printed or written, herein contained, including the condition:; on 
back hereof, which are hereby agreed to by the shipper ar.d accepted for himself ar.d his assigns. 
(Mail or street address of consigne~For purposes of not~fication only.) . 
Consigned to ........ H. G. Miles and ·company . ..: .. 7 ........................................................................................................................................................... "~-.......... : ........... .. 
Destination ........................ New York ...................................................... State of ................ N Y ................ County of ....................................................... :: .. ·~-. ................ . 
Route _______ , ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ .. 
----·----·--·--------------····---------.. (':i)~ii;~~i~g··~a;;{;;y--·--····------·---·-~-----·---------·----------------Car Initial ............... S ................ Qar No ..................... 339981 ... _______________ __ 
No. 
Packages 








If this shipment is to be 
delivered to the consignee 
without recourse on the con-
-----1------------------------~l------l---·--·•-----l signort the consignor shall sign 
the following statement: 
...... 486 ...... Baskets Cukes. ................................................. ~---------------------------··----- __________ · ........... ------------··--- ·---------···-·----
---------- 1 ...... Barrel 
........ 16 ------ Barrels Potatoes S L & C .................................................................. -----------·------·------------------····----------------
The carrier shall not make · 
delivery of thiq shipment with-
out payment of freight and 
all other lawful charges. (See 
section 7 of conditions.) 
.................. : . ........................................................................ Boone ~arm. ___ _: ___________ ----------............. ··-----·----------- --··-··------------ ·-----·(si'g~at.;"~--or-~c;~~i-g;c;;)-···· 
·--················ .......................... ----······-·········--·--··-·················------·.'----··············-------------······ ................................. ·····-------······· ·········-----···--
~f charges are to be prepaid, 
write or stamp here, "To be 
Prepaid.". 
------------------ ···-·················-------···············-·······-··--------··················-------··----··-··--·------- ···----······--·······-· ·---------········· ---------········· R d 
· · eceive $ .. _________ ·-----··----·-··· 
=~:=:::= ~:~~:~~::~==;;~~=::~;:=~:::~:~=:~~:=:::~==::::==~:~~~~~:~ ~:::=~~~~:=::: :::::::~~~~~~~:~ ::=::~~~~=~~ .,t~;[~~!~r.Y~".,~: 
C W C 1 
-----·----------xi~n-i--;;;··a~iti;;:--·· 
.................... . . o eman, _______ , ...................................................................... _____ ._ _____________ ----------·------- ·---------·-······· 
Judge. Per·-------··-·--------·-··--------------····· 
---·------- ··----·--····-·-·· ----------···----·--···--····--·------------.. ----·----------------------- -----------·--··· ···-------........ ---------···-··- (The signature here ac-
knowledges onlv the amount 
prepaid.) ~ 
*H the shipment moves between two ports by a carrier by water, the law requires that the bill of lading shall 
state whether 1t is "carrier's or shipperts weight." · 
NoTE.-Wher.e the rate is dependent on value, shippers are required to state specifically in writing the agreed 
or declared value of the property. · 
The agreed or declared value of the property is hereby specifi.cally stated by the shipper to be not exceeding 
Charges Advanced: 
$ ______________________________________ _ 
------------·-------·--------···--····----.. ··-·------.... -................................... per .... -----:----··-: .................... .:............................................................. _. 
------··-------------··-------··-----·--···-------------------.. --·---··-------------·----------------.. --.. Shipper ---------•--·------------· .. --·-··:---------------· ..................................................... ..Agent 
Per _______ .................................................................................................... Per·-----···-·----····--·········---·---··-···-····· .. --........................................ - .......... . 
Permanent post-office address of shipper ................................................................................................................................................................. ~ .............................. .. 
·, 
/ 
i . . 
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CONTRACT TEAMS AND CONDITIONS. 
1 
Sec. ~· (a) The carrier or party in possession of any of the property herein des~ribed shall be liable as at common law for any loss thereof or damage thereto. AXnent ll8 herein-
after proVIded. · 
(b) No carrier or party in possession of all or any of the property herein described shall be liable for any loss thereof or damage thereto or delaf caused by the net '>f God, the 
public enem,y, the authority of law, or the act or default of the shipper or owner ot for natural shrinkage. The cMrier's liability shall be that o warehoust'man, only, for loss, 
aamage, or delay caused by fire occurring after the expiration of the free time allowed by tariffs lawfully on file (such free time to be computed aa therein provided) after notice of 
the arrival of the property at destination or at the port of export (if intended for e:ICport) has been duly sent or given, and after placement of the property for delivery at destination 
or tender of delivery of the property to the party entitled to receive it, hns been made. Except ir. cRSe of neldigence of the carrier'or party in possession (and the burden to prove 
freed!>m from such negli~ence sh;11ll be on tlie carrier or partr in possession), the farri~r or party in possession shnll not be ~iabla for loss, damage,. or ~elay 6ccurring while the prop-
erty IS stopped and held tn tranSlt upon· the request of the .shipper, owner., or part)'! ent1tled to make such request, or resulttng from a defect or v1ce m the property, or for count.ry 
damage to cotton. o.r from riots or strikes. · ~ . ·~ 
(c) In case of quarantine the property may be discharged at risk and expense f owners into 'quarnntine depot or elsewhere, ns required by quarantine regul11tions or authorities, 
or for the carrier's disp11tch at nearest available point in carrier's judgment, and in y such case carrier's responsibility shall cease when property is so discharged, or property may 
be returned by carrier at owner's expense to shipping point, earning freight both\ways. Qunrantinc expensE.s of whatever nature or kind upon or in respect to property shall be 
borne by the owners of the property or be a lien thereon. The r.arrier shall not b liable for loss or damage or.casioned by fumigation or disinfection or other arts required or done 
by quarantine regulations or authorities even though tl}e same may have been done y ·carrier's officers, agents, or employees, nor for detention, loss, or damage of any kmd occasioned 
by QU!'rantine or the enfo~cement thereof. ~o carrier sha!l be liable, exrept in cas~ 1of negligenre, for any mistnko or inaccu~cy in any information furnished by ~he carrier, its agents, 
or offtrel'!l, as to quaro.ntmP. laws or regulattons. The shipper shall hold the carn~rs harmltss from any expense thef ·may mcur, or ds.mages they may be requued to pay, by reason 
of the introduction of tile property covert>d by this contract into any plnce ngairst the quarantine lnws or regulnt.ions tn effect at such place. 
Sec. 2. (n) No carrier is bound to transport said property by any particular *rain or vessel, or in time for any po.rticular market or otherwise than with reasonable dispatch. 
Every carrier shall have the right in case of p.hysical necessity" to forward said pr~rty bY. any carrier or route between the point of shipment and the point of destination. In :dl 
eases not prohibited by law, where a lower value than actual value has been rep PsenteCI in writing by tho shippor or has been agreed upon in writing as the released value of tile 
proprrty as determined by the r.lnssification or ttu'iffs· upon which the rate is b , such lower value plus freight charges if paid shn!l be the maximum s.mount to be recovered, 
whether or not such loss or damage occurs fro01 negligence. . . 
(b) Claims for lrss, damage, or injury to property must be made in writing to e originating or delivering carrier or carriers issuing. this bill of lading within si:s: month!! after 
delivery of the property (or, in case of e:s:port traffic, within nine months after dAlivery at port of export) or, in case of failure to make delivery, then within si:s: months (or nine 
months in case of export traffic) after a reii.SOnable time !or delivery baa Pla~edl provided that if such less, damage, or injury was due to delay or ds.mage while being loaded or 
unloaded, or damaged in tnu:sit by ~arelessness or negligence, then no notice of clairp nor filing of claim shall be required ns a condition precedent to recovery. Suits for loss, damage, 
injuzy, or dclnr shall be i:ostituted only within t'!o years an~ one day after: delivery [If the,Pt:aPrrty, or in caae «?f fai~u~c to .m~ke ~elivery, then ~ithin two ~ears and one day after 
a reasonable tsme for deltvery has elapsed: ProVIded, That m case the clo.~m on which swt LS bo.sed was made tn wr1t1ng wsthm s1x months or n1nc months sn case of export traffic 
(whether or not filing of such claim is required as a condition precedent to recoveiy), suit shall be instituted not later than two years and one day after notice in writing is gi•;en 
by the carrier to tile clnimant that the carrier has disallowed thl.' claim -.~r any part or parts thereof specified in the notice. 
(c) Anr t'.arrier or party liable on account of loss of or damage to any of said property shall have the fUll benefit of any insurance that may have been effected upon or on ac-
count of S!Ud property, so far ns this shall not avoid th~ policies or contracts of instirance: Provided, That the carrier reimburse tile claimant for the premium paid thereon. · 
See. a. Except where such service is required ns the result of carrier's negligence, all property shall be subject to necessary cooperage and baling at owner's cost. Each carrier 
over whose route cotton or cotton. li.ntors is to be transported hereunder shall ha,·e the privilege, at its own cost and risk of compressing the same for greater convenience in handlin_g 
or forwarding, and shall not l>e held responsible for deviation or unavoidable delaY,a in procurin~t such comprf.'ssion. Grain in bulk consigned to a point where there is a railroad, 
public or licensed elevator, may (unless otlier\\;se expressly noted herein, t>nd the~ if it is not promptly unloaded}·be there delivered and placed with other grain of the same kind 
and grade without respect to ownership (and prompt notice thereof shnll be give~ to the cons:gnor), and if so delivered shall be subject to a lien for elevator charges in addition 
to all other charges hereunder. · · 
Sec. 4. (a) Propp.rty not rpmoved by tile party entitled to receive it within the free time allowed by tariffs, lawfully on file (such free time to be computed ns therein provided) 
after notice of the arrivw of the property at destination or at tile port of export (i~ intended for export) has been duly ssnt or given, and after placement of the property for delh•ery 
at destination has been marle, may be kept in vessel, c:nr, depot, warehouse or plac:e of delivery of the carrier, subject to the tariff charge for storage and to carrier's responsibility 
as warehouseman, only, or at the optir>n of the carrier, may be removed to and stdred in a .Public or licensed warehouse at the pltlee or delivery or other available place, at the cost 
of the owner, and there held without liability on tile part of the carrier, and subj~' t to alien for all freight and otller lawful charges, including a reasonable charge for storage. 
(bJ Where nonperishable property which hns been transported to destination he eunder is refused by consignee or the party entitled to receive it, or said consignee or P,arty entitled 
to receive it fail:J to receive it within 15 days after notice of arrival shall have bee duly sent or given, tl!e carrier may sell tho same at publie"auction to the highest btdder, at such 
place as may be designated by the carriar: Prorided, That the carrier shall have first mailed, sent, or given to tile consignor notice that the property hns been refused or remains 
unclaimed, ns the e.ase may be, and that it will be subject to sale under the termslof the bill of lading if disposition he not arranged for, and shall have published notice containing 
a description of tile property, the name of the partf to whom consigned, or, if shibped order notify, the name of the party to be notified, and the time and place of sale, once a week 
for two succesaive weeks, in a newspaper of genera circulation at the plar.a of sate or nearest plo.ce where such newspaper is published: Provided, That 30 days shall have elapsed 
before publication of notir.e of sale after said notice that the property was refusedl or remail's unrlo.imed wns mailed, sent, or given. 
(c) Where pedshable property which has been transported hereunder to desdnation is refused by cor:sigoee or partr entitled to receive it, or said consignee or party entitled 
to receive it shall fail to receive it promptly, thP carrier may, in its discrf!tion, td prevent deterioration or further deterioration, sell the same to the best advantage at private or 
public SV:l~: PFOvide-d, That. if ti~c serves for notification to the consignor. or owne~ o.r the refusal of the property or tile failure to receive it and requeat for disposition of the property, 
such nottflcat.ion shall be ~.nven, 10 such mnnner ns the exercise of due d.bgenco recjwrcs, before the property 1s sold. 
(d) Where tbe procedure provided for in the two paragraphs lnst prooeding is ;not passible, it is agreed that nothing contained in said paragraphs shall be construed to abridge 
the right of the carrier at its option to sell the propert.y ur-der such circumstancr_'liand in such manner llA may be authorized by law. 
(e) The proceeds of any sale mo.de under this section shall be applied by the cnrrier to the pnyment of frc1ght, demurrage, storage, and any other lawful charges and the expense 
of noti<'e, advP.rtisem.ent, siile, and other necessary exper:se and of caring for and maintaining the property, if proper cnre of the same requirea special expense, and should there be 
a balance it shall be paid to the owner of the property sold h<:reunder. j · 
U> Property destined to or taken from o. station, wharf, or landing at whichi tllere is no regularly appointed frP.ight agent shall be entirely at risk of owner after unloaded from 
cars or vessels or until loaded into cars or vessels, ai'J.d except in case of carrier's negligence, when received from or delivered to such stations, wharvt'S, or landings shall be at owner's 
risk until tile cars are attMhed to and after tliey 11re detached from locomotive ori train or until loaded into and after unloaded from vess3la. 
Sec. 5. No carrier hereunder will carry or be liable in any way for any doctimentsi spaeie, or for any articles of extraordinary value not specifically rated in the published classi~ 
fications or tariffs unless a specialllgreement to do so and a stipulAted value of ~artie es are indorsed hereon. . .. 
. See: 6. EvC?ry party, ~·hethe~ priQcipal or agent, ~hipping explosives or dang us goo-:!s, without Previous full written rlist;losure to the carrier .of their 0;11tur~. shall be l~hle 
for and mdemnify the earner against nll loss or damage cnusea by such gc;ods, an such· goods mar be wnrehoused at owner's rssk and expense or destroyed Without compensation. 
Sec. 7. The owner or consignee shall pay the frnight and a\"erage, if any, and a!l other lawfu charges accruing on said property; but, except in diose instances where it tnay 
lawfully be authorized to do so, no carrier by railroad shall deliver or relinq_uish poSsession at destination of the property covered by this bill of laiing until all tariff rates and charges 
. thereon have been paid. The consignor shall be liable for the freight and all other lawfUl charges, except. that if the consignor stipulates, by s:gnature, in the space provided for 
thnt purpose on the face of this bill of lading that the carrier shall not make delivery without requiring l?ayment of such charges and the carrter, contrnry to such stipulation, shall 
make delivery without requiring such payment, the ronsignor shall not be liable for such charges. Nothtng herein s~alllimit t.he right of the co.rrier to require at time of shipment 
the prepayment or guarantee of the chMges. U upon inspection it is ascertained that the articles shipJ?ed are not diose described in ·this bill of lading, the freight charges must be 
paid upon the articles actually shipped. I · 
Sec. 8. If this bill of ladfug is issued on the order of the shipper, or his agen~· in e:s:change or in substitution for anotller bill of lading, the shipper's signature to the prior bill 
of lading as to the statement of value or otherwise, or election of common law or bill of lading liability, in or in connection with such prior b:.ll of lading, sbnll be considered a part 
of this bill of larling as fully as if the ssme were written or made in or in <'onnec~· n with this 6ill of lading. 
8P.c. 9. (a) If all or any part Q( said property is carried by water over nny rt of said route, such water carriage shall be pArformed subject to nll the terms and provisions of 
and all tile exemption!! from liability contained in, the Act of the Congress of t United States, approved on February 13, 1893, and entitled "An act relating to the navigation of 
_ v~.!?ls!··e~ .• '.' an'! of l)th!lr sta.tutt"S !Jf the United States according !=arPiers by water the protection of limited liability, and to the n!)uditions contained in this bill of lading not in-
conststent thl!rcwtth or'Wtth•thtS section.· - -· -- . . L · 
(b) No such c.'\rrier by watt-r shall be liable for any lo88 or dam~e resulting from any fire happening to or Gn board the VeDUel, or from explosion, burstin~r of boilers or breakage 
of shafts, unlc:!S caused by the design.or neglect of such carrier. . (c) If the owner shall have exercised due diligence in making the vessel in all reepects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped, and supplied, no such carrier shall be liable 
for any loss or damage ruultin~ from the perils of the lakes, seas, or otller wo.tP.rs, or from latent defects in hull, machinery, or appurtenances whether existing prior to, o.t the time 
of, or.n!ter sailing, or from c:Oll1sion, stranding, or other accidents of navigation, or from prolongation of the voyage. And, when for any reason it is necessary, any vessel carrying 
any or al_l of the. property herein described shall be at liberty to call o.t anf port or ports, in or out of the customary route, to tow and be towed, to transfer, trans-ship, or lighter, 
to load and discharge goods at. anY. time, to nssist vessels in distreSs, to de\·zate for the purpose of llllving life or property, and for docking and repairs. Except in case of negligence 
snch carrier shall not be responsiole for any less or damage to propert)' if it be necessary or is usual to carry the same upon derk. · . · · 
(d) General average shall be payable according to York-Antwerp Rules, 1890, and, ns to an.v matter not therein provided for, acrording to tile law and· ussge of the port of New 
York. If the owners shall have exercised due diligence to make the vessel in nll respects seaworthy Rnd properly manned, equipped, and supplied, it is hereby agreed that in case 
of danger, damage, or disnster resulting from faults or errors in navigation, or .in the ma.,agement of the vessel, or from any latent or other defects in the vessel, her machinery or 
appurtenancie8, or from unseaworthineBS, whether existing at the time of shipment or at the beginning of the voyage (provided the latent or other defects or the unseo.worthiness 
wns not dlscovernble by the exercise of due diligence), the shippers, consignees and/or owners of the cargo shnll nevertheless pay salvage and any special charges incurred in respect 
of the cargo, and shall contribute with the ship owner in J~:eneral average to the payment of any s11crifices, losses or expenses of a general average nature that mo.y be made or incurred 
for the common hencfit or to rt:lie\"e the adventure from any common peril. · (e) If the property is heing carried uvder a tariff which provides that o.ny earrier or carriers po.rty thereto shall be liable for loss from pt>rila of the sea, then us to such carrier or 
cmrriers the provisicns of thi~> &etion shall be modified in accordance with the tariff provisions, which shall be regarde-d as incorporated into the conditions of this bill of lading. 
(f) Tb~ term "water. carriage" in this section shnll not be construed as including lighterage in or across rivers, harbors, or lakes, when. performed by or on behalf of rail carriers •. 
Sec. 10. Any altt>ration, adriition, or erRSure in this bill of lading which shall be made without the special notation hereon of the agent of the carrier issuing this bill of lading, 
shall be witllout effect, and this bill of lading shall be enforceable !'ccording to its original tenor. 
. John Barton Payne, etc., v. L. J. Upton & Co. 39' 
page ~7 ~ (PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 2.) 
Phila., Pa. Nov. 13, 1919. 
Claim No. 874957-H 
Open File 
L. J. Upton & Co. 
SPECIAL 
Mr. R. V. Massey, Gen. Supt., 
P. R. R., Ne·w Jersey Div., 
New York, N. Y. 
Dear Sir:-
$340.22 
Norfolk, Va. to Pier 27, N.Y. W/B SR 588, 6-26-18, cover-
ing Sou. car 339981, loaded with cukes, consigned to H. G. 
~Iiles & Co., New York, N. Y., Pier 28, N. Y. freight bill 
140111, 7-2-18. . 
In accordance with the information furnished by Mr. 
Sheaffer this car arrived at Harimus Cove on June 29, 1918 
at 1.30 A. ~f., while same was not delivered until July 2, 
1918. 
Will you kindly investigate the handling of this car with 
your people, advising full facts relating to the delay, cause 
and extent, if delayed on account heavy arrivals, advise under 
normal condition what time car would have been ready for 
delivery and what market, promptly and oblige. · 
ECP 
Your truly, 
R. L. FRANKLIN, 
Freight Claim A~ent. 
C. W. COLE~iAN, Judge. 
page 28. ~ T~e Cdmmonwealth of Virginia, 
To the Sheriff of Norfolk County, Greeting: 
You are hereby Commanded to Summon John Barton 
Payne, Director General· of Railroads, Walker D. Hines, for-
merly Director General of Railroads, and Southern Railway 
Company, a Corporation, to appear at the Clerk's Office of 
our Circuit Court of Norfolk County, at the Rules to. be held 
for said Court on the fourth 1\fonday in June, 1920, to answer 
40 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
L. J. Upton and Company, Incorporated, a corporation, of 
a plea of trespass on the case dam~ges $1,000.00. 
And have then and there this summons. 
Witness: G. TAYLOE GWATHMEY, Clerk of our said 
Court, at his office this lOth day of June, 1920, in the 144 
year of the Commonwealth. 
G. TAYLOE GWATHMEY, Clerk. 
By HUGH JOHNSTON, D. C. 
Nor finding any official of The Southern Ry. Co. within my 
jurisdiction upon whom services could be obtained: Exe-
cuted in the Co. of .Norfolk, Va. this 11th day of.June 1920 
by delivering a true copy thereof to Geo. A. McGee, Agent 
of The Southern Ry. Co. where he resides. 
page 29 ~ State of Virginia, 
A. A. WENDEL, 
Sheriff of Norfolk Co. Va. 
By G. C. SMITH, . 
Deputy Sheriff. 
County of Norfolk, to-wit: 
I, A. B. Carney, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Norfolk 
County, State aforesaid, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
is a true transcript from the records in the case named, to-
gether with copy of certificates of exceptions certified by the 
Judge. • · 
I further certify that said transcript 'vas not made up 
and completed until the plaintiff had due notice of the making 
of the same as requ.ired by law. 
Given under my hand, this the 14th day of August, 1928. 
A. B .. CARNEY, Clerk. 
By V. C. RANDALL, ·~ 
Deputy Clerk. 
A C~py-Teste : 
H. STEWART JONES, C. C. 
·INDEX 
Page 
Petition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Recorcl ............................................ 17 
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
Plea .. · ............................................ 24 
Verdict . . . . . ...................................... 25 
,J udgme11t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Bill of E:xception No. 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
Defendant's Bill of Exception No. 2 ................... 27 
Evide11ce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
A. S. Hargrove ............................... 31-27 
L. J\1:. Norman . . . . . . ........................... 33-31 
Instrt1ctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
Bill of Lading ...................................... 37 
Correspondence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H!.J 
Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
